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Priority of Mechanics' Liens in Texas: Diversified Mortgage
Investors v. Lloyd D. Blaylock General Contractor, Inc.
Lloyd D. Blaylock General Contractor, Inc., and Lloyd D. Blaylock, in-
dividually,1 held duly perfected mechanics' liens2 on certain properties
pursuant to a construction contract with Dollar Inns of America. Diversi-
fied Mortgage Investors (DMI) acquired deed of trust3 liens on these same
properties through arrangements by which DMI provided permanent
financing to Dollar Inns for purchase of the land and a prior vendor's
lien,4 and for construction of two motels on these properties. Dollar Inns
1. Hereinafter collectively referred to as "Blaylock."
2. A mechanic's lien is a claim created by law for the purpose of securing a priority of
payment of the price or value of work performed and materials furnished in erecting or
repairing a building or other structure, usually attaching to the land as well as to the build-
ings erected thereon. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 37; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5452
(Vernon Supp. 1978-1979). See also Schutze v. Dabney, 204 S.W. 342, 344 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1918), rev'don other grounds, 228 S.W. 176 (Tex. 1921); Dilworth & Green v.
Ed Steves & Sons, 169 S.W. 630, 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1914), writ dism'd, 107
Tex. 73, 174 S.W. 279 (1915); Zollars v. Snyder & Lacey, 94 S.W. 1096, 1097 (Tex. Civ. App.
1906, no writ). The term "mechanic's lien," as used herein, includes the lien given for mate-
rialmen as well as workmen. Although occasionally it is necessary to stress the distinction
between a mechanic and a materialman, the difference is generally ignored by courts and
commentators.
3. A deed of trust is a conveyance given as security for the performance of an obliga-
tion and is generally regarded as containing the elements of a valid mortgage. Lucky
Homes, Inc. v. Tarrant Sav. Ass'n, 379 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth), rev'd on
other grounds, 390 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. 1964). See also Johnson v. Snell, 504 S.W.2d 397, 399
(Tex. 1974); Phillips v. Campbell, 480 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The distinction between an express vendor's lien and a
purchase-money mortgage deed of trust is that in a vendor's lien situation, the vendor re-
tains a security interest securing the purchase money debt, whereas under the modern
purchase-money mortgage deed of trust situation, a lending company loans the purchase
money to a vendee who conveys the property in trust to a trustee designated by the lender to
secure the repayment of the purchase money. Once the lender satisfies the vendee's obliga-
tion to the vendor, the lender is subrogated to the vendor's lien. Lloyd D. Blaylock, Gen.
Contractor, Inc. v. Dollar Inns of America, Inc., 548 S.W.2d 924, 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1977), rev'dsub nom. Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D. Blaylock Gen. Contractor,
Inc., 576 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1978). This distinction is in accord with the rule that a lien is
impressed with the character of the debt it is given to secure; and if given to secure purchase
money, it has the status of a purchase money lien. See Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mort-
gage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971); National W. Life Ins. Co. v. Acreman, 415 S.W.2d
265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967), modified, 425 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. 1968); C.D.
Shamburger Lumber Co. v. Holbert, 34 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1931, no
writ); Thompson v. Litwood Oil & Supply Co., 287 S.W. 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1926,
no writ).
4. A vendor's lien is either the implied lien of a vendor of real estate, who has con-
veyed the legal title, as security for the unpaid purchase money, or the express lien of a
vendor of real estate under a provision of the contract that he is to retain title until the
purchase money is paid, the vendee being in possession of the premises. See Flanagan v.
Cushman, 48 Tex. 241 (1877); Davis v. Huff, 288 S.W. 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1926,
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subsequently defaulted on its deeds of trust, and DMI purchased the
properties at a foreclosure sale. At trial, DMI and Blaylock sought a dec-
laration of the priorities of their claims. Additionally, Blaylock sought to
recover the balance due on the construction contract and to foreclose the
mechanics' liens on the properties. In the alternative, Blaylock sought to
recover the amount due on the construction contracts from the proceeds of
the deed of trust foreclosure sales. The trial court rendered judgment
against Dollar Inns, holding it liable on the construction contract. The
trial court ruled that Blaylock take nothing from DMI, however, because
the deed of trust liens were superior to the mechanics' liens. The court of
appeals reversed,5 holding that DMI's deed of trust mortgages were supe-
rior to the mechanics' liens only to the extent that such mortgages secured
the purchase money and not the construction loans. Moreover, the court
of appeals held that Blaylock could recover from DMI out of the proceeds
of the deed of trust foreclosure sales that exceeded the purchase money
loaned from DMI's assignor to Dollar Inns. Both DMI and Blaylock ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of Texas. DMI asserted that the appellate
court erred in determining the inception of the mechanic's lien held by
Blaylock. Both DMI and Blaylock argued that the court erred in its deter-
mination of the priority of the liens. Held, reversed in part, and modified
and affirmed in part:6 DMI's deed of trust lien on the Fort Worth property
is senior and superior to Blaylock's mechanic's lien. Therefore, the deed of
trust foreclosure extinguishes the junior mechanic's lien. As to the Irving
property, DMI's deed of trust lien is senior and superior to Blaylock's
mechanic's lien only to the extent of the preexisting vendor's lien. Beyond
the amount of the vendor's lien, Blaylock has a valid and subsisting lien.
Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D Blaylock General Contractor,
Inc., 576 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1978).
I. PRIORITY OF MECHANICS' LIENS
Mechanics' liens are made possible by constitutional or statutory provi-
sion 7 for the purpose of assuring payment to those persons who increase
writ dism'd); Norvell, The Vendor's Lien and Reservation of the Paramount Legal Title-The
Rights of Vendors, Vendees, and Subvendees, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 22 (1965). See also Kansas
City Life Ins. Co. v. Wellfare, 110 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1937, writ ref d);
Parlin & Orendorff Co. v. Davis' Estate, 74 S.W. 951, 952 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903, writ refd).
5. Lloyd D. Blaylock, Gen. Contractor, Inc. v. Dollar Inns of America, Inc., 548
S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977).
6. This holding was the result of a rehearing and subsequent withdrawal by the court
of its original opinion as regards the issue of equitable subrogation. See note 84 infra.
7. See Lippencott v. York, 86 Tex. 276, 279, 24 S.W. 275, 276 (1893); Pratt v. Tudor,
14 Tex. 37 (1855). In Texas, both statutory and constitutional mechanics' liens exist. The
constitutional mechanic's lien is embodied in TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 37, which provides:
Mechanics, artisans and material men, of every class, shall have a lien upon
the buildings and articles made or repaired by them for the value of their
labor done thereon, or material furnished therefor; and the Legislature shall
provide by law for the speedy and efficient enforcement of said liens.
The constitutional lien is self-executing between the property owner and the workman.
Strang v. Prang, 89 Tex. 525, 35 S.W. 1054 (1876); Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v.
Taylor, 40 S.W. 876 (Tex. Civ. App.), aftd, 91 Tex. 78, 40 S.W. 966 (1897). The lien, how-
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the value of the land at the owner's request.8 Mechanics and materialmen,
in whose favor the lien is imposed, are not free, however, to attach their
liens in isolation. Other individuals such as construction lenders and deed
of trust holders have their own legitimate interests to protect when the land
serves as security for their loans. When the landowner, as a result of
financial difficulties, is forced to sell the land in order to satisfy the claims
of lienholders, the proceeds of the sale often are depleted before the satis-
faction of all liens. Faced with this common situation, each lienholder will
attempt to have his claim satisfied before the available funds have been
disbursed to other lienholders. In the absence of a statutory scheme,
mechanics' liens achieve priority according to the chronol9gical order of
their attachment9 relative to the attachment of other encumbrances.' ° The
Texas Legislature has attempted to order the competing interests of
lienholders by promulgating article 5459, section 1 of the Texas Revised
Civil Statutes." Enacted in its present form in 1889,12 the statute gives
perfected mechanics' liens priority over liens perfected after the inception
ever, binds owners only to the original contractor and is ineffective against third parties
without notice. Id. Thus, full protection is assured only by compliance with the more com-
plex statutory provisions found in TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5452-5472e (Vernon
1958 & Supp. 1978-1979). Comment, Proceduresfor Claiming and Priority of Mechanics'and
Materialmen's Liens in Texas, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 21 (1969).
8. See Lippencott v. York, 86 Tex. 276, 280, 24 S.W. 275, 276 (1893). See also Com-
ment, Priority of Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens in Texas, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 872 (1962).
Payment is assured by the imposition of a lien upon the improved land in the workman's
favor until the workman is fully compensated. See William Cameron & Co. v. Trueheart,
165 S.W. 58, 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1914, no writ).
In addition to the mechanic's lien, statutes in most states grant limited relief to those who,
without any legal interest in the land, improve or cause land to be improved. These statutes
are called "occupying claimants, betterment or improver in good faith" statutes. See TEX.
REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. arts. 7393-7401A (Vernon 1960 & Supp. 1978-1979). The Texas stat-
ute requires that the improver be in possession at least one year to claim thereunder. Id. art.
7393.
9. Attachment is a form of execution issued before judgment, and is an ancillary pro-
ceeding to preserve intact the title to the attached property so that it may be applied to the
debt when established, and affects only the title that is subject to execution for the debt sued
on. Stewart v. Rockdale State Bank, 52 S.W.2d 915, 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1932),
aff'd, 79 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. 1935).
10. For example, absent statutory intervention, a prior vendor's lien or deed of trust lien
is superior to a subsequent mechanic's lien. Hammann v. H.J. McMullen & Co., 122 Tex.
476, 482, 62 S.W.2d 59, 61 (1933).
11. The statutory provision establishing priority of lien states:
The lien herein provided for shall attach to the house, building, improvements
or railroad for which they were furnished or the work was done, in preference
to any prior lien or encumbrance or mortgage upon the land upon which the
houses, buildings or improvements, or railroad have been put, or labor per-
formed, and the person enforcing the same may have such house, building or
improvement, or any piece of the railroad property, sold separately; provided,
any lien, encumbrance or mortgage on the land or improvement at the time of
the inception of the lien herein provided for shall not be affected thereby, and
holders of such liens need not be made parties in suits to foreclose liens herein
provided for.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
12. 1889 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 98, §§ 1-20, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1138-42
(1898). For a presentation of the historical development of the statutory lien in Texas, see
Youngblood, Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens in Texas, 26 Sw. L.J. 665 (1972).
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of the mechanics' liens. 3 Disagreement as to when inception occurs, how-
ever, has been a continuous cause of litigation.
Prior to the enactment of section 2 of article 545914 in May 1971, the
legislature had provided no criteria by which to determine the date of in-
ception. 5 This lack of statutory guidelines forced the judiciary to establish
tests grounded in case law for determination of inception dates of mechan-
ics' liens.16 The Texas Supreme Court considered the meaning of the stat-
utory phrase "the inception of the lien" 7 for the first time in Oriental Hotel
Co. v. Grfiths.8 The court stated that the word "inception" referred to
the date of the original contract between the owner and the builder:
The word "inception" means "initial stage.". . . It does not refer to a
state of actual existence, but to a condition of things or circumstances
from which the thing may develop. When the building has been pro-
jected, and construction of it entered upon,-that is, contracted for,-
the circumstances exist out of which all future contracts for labor and
material necessary to its completion may arise, and for all such labor
and material a common lien is given by the statute; and in this state of
circumstances the lien to secure each has its "inception."' 9
This definition, affirmed in subsequent decisions,2" allowed inception to
occur at a relatively early date. Since the execution of construction con-
tracts usually precedes delivery of materials or actual commencement of
construction, the inception date of the lien will usually precede any on-site
indication of construction. By according this favorable treatment to
mechanics' liens, the court's opinion joined a series of opinions liberally
construing this statute designed to protect laborers and materialmen who
13. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § I (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
14. Id. § 2.
15. See note 11 supra.
16. The Supreme Court of Texas initially confronted the problem in Trammell v.
Mount, 68 Tex. 210, 4 S.W. 377 (1887). The court held that a mechanic's lien, upon perfec-
tion, related back "to the time when the work was performed or the material furnished." Id.
at 215, 4 S.W. at 379. The Trammel court did not construe article 5459, but rather its statu-
tory predecessor, 1885 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 66, art. 3171, at 64, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAS 784 (1898), which fixed the critical date as that on which the lien accrued rather than
the date of the inception of the lien.
17. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
18. 88 Tex. 574, 33 S.W. 652 (1895).
19. Id. at 583-84, 33 S.W. at 662 (citation omitted); see Comment, Statutory Criteria/or
Determining the Time of Inception of Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens, 9 Hous. L. REV.
174 (1971). The court also held, pursuant to the relation-back doctrine, that the inception of
subcontracts executed at a later date would be deemed to have occurred on the same day as
the original general contract. For a discussion of the relation-back doctrine, see Comment,
Procedures for Claiming and Priority of Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens in Texas, 21
BAYLOR L. REV. 21, 31-42 (1969).
20. See University Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Security Lumber Co., 423 S.W.2d 287, 295
(Tex. 1967); McConnell v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 157 Tex. 572, 579-80, 305 S.W.2d 280, 284
(1957); Sullivan v. Texas Briquette & Coal Co., 94 Tex. 541, 545, 63 S.W. 307, 308 (1901);
Finger Furniture Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 413 S.W.2d 131,136 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Newman v. Coker, 310 S.W.2d 354, 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1958, no writ); Investor's Syndicate v. Dallas Plumbing Co., 61 S.W.2d 1039, 1040
(Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1933, no writ).
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by their contribution add to the value of the property.2'
In the first of two opinions by the Texas Supreme Court addressing the
controversy in Irving Lumber Co. v. A11ex Mortgage Co.,22 the court at-
tempted to extend the favorable treatment already accorded mechanics'
liens. The plaintiff, Irving Lumber Company, orally contracted to build
houses on four lots, the purchase of which Merit Homes, Incorporated, was
then negotiating. Contemporaneously with vesting of title to the four lots
in Merit Homes, Alltex Mortgage Company, the defendant, acquired a
deed of trust lien on the land as security for purchase money and construc-
tion loans. Irving Lumber's oral agreement to provide labor and materials
to Merit Homes antedated Alltex's lien, but Irving Lumber failed to begin
construction until after execution of the deed of trust. Suit was brought
after Merit Homes defaulted on the note held by Alltex, thus triggering the
foreclosure provisions of the deed of trust. Both the trial court and the
court of appeals had held for the defendant. The supreme court, however,
initially reversed, holding that the inception of Irving Lumber's liens oc-
curred on the date of the oral, executory contract with Merit Homes, and
therefore was prior to the liens created by the deed of trust.23 Thus, fore-
closure under the power of sale did not extinguish Irving Lumber's liens.24
In response to this decision, the Texas Legislature enacted an amend-
ment to article 5459, intending to settle seventy-five years of ambiguity as
to the meaning of the term "inception of the lien."' 25 This legislative ac-
tion, set forth in section 2 of article 5459,26 relieves mortgagors of the un-
21. University Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Security Lumber Co., 423 S.W.2d 287, 296 (Tex.
1967).
22. 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 212 (Feb. 6, 1971), withdrawn on rehearing, 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex.
1971).
23. See 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 214-15. The court held that the date of an oral contract,
though unrecorded and executory, was the inception date for a perfected mechanic's lien.
Id. at 213. If an oral contract could determine the inception date for a perfected mechanic's
lien, then no lending institution could be certain that a security interest would be free of
adverse claims. Seventy-five years of liberal construction favoring mechanics' liens had thus
culminated in a judicially equitable, but commercially unreasonable result. See Comment,
supra note 19, at 178.
24. 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 214.
25. Senate Bill 733 was introduced in Feb. 1971. The bill was passed and became im-
mediately effective on May 17, 1971, under an emergency clause that provided:
Sec. 2. The importance of this legislation and the crowded condition of the
calendars in both Houses and the problems and confusion created by the
Texas Supreme Court's recent decision in the case of Irving Lumber Company
v. Alltex Mortgage Company create an emergency and an imperative public
necessity that the Constitutional Rule requiring bills to be read on three sev-
eral days in each House be suspended, and this Rule is hereby suspended; and
this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and it is so
enacted.
1971 Tex. Gen. Laws, S.B. 733, ch. 231, § 2, at 1082; see Comment, Statutory Criteria/or
Determining the Time of Inception of Mechanics' and Materialmens' Liens, 9 Hous. L. REV.
174, 176 (1971).
26. TEX. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) provides:
Section 2. The time of the inception of the lien, as used in this article, shall
mean the occurrence of the earliest of any one of the following events:
(a) The actual commencement of construction of the improvements or the
delivery of material to the land upon which the improvements are to be lo-
1979]
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certainty of secret mechanics' liens. The statute provides that a
materialman must give actual notice by visible commencement of con-
struction or delivery of material to be used in the construction. Alterna-
tively, the materialman must give constructive notice either by recording
an affidavit describing an oral contract or by recording a copy of the writ-
ten contract.27
Upon rehearing subsequent to the enactment of section 2, the supreme
court retracted its first opinion in Irving Lumber.28 In its revised opinion
the court concluded that title to the property had not vested in Merit
Homes at the time the contractor agreed to furnish labor and materials.
The court therefore held that Alltex's deed of trust lien took priority over
Irving Lumber's mechanic's lien, because "the priority of a security inter-
est is not determined on the date of the 'inception' of an agreement be-
tween the contractor and a prospective owner.'"29
When Merit Homes acquired the land, it borrowed from Alltex a total of
$137,850, which was secured by a deed of trust. Only $10,600 of the loan
was used in payment for the land. In the first opinion on Irving Lumber
the court afforded only the $10,600 the status of a vendor's lien because the
balance of the loan was used to pay for improvements and should not
cated for use thereon for which the lien herein provided results, provided such
commencement or material is actually visible from inspection of the land
upon which the improvements are being made; or
(b) If the agreement for the construction of the improvements or any part
thereof or the agreement to perform labor or furnish material or provide spe-
cially fabricated material in connection with such construction resulting in the
lien herein provided for is written, the recording of such agreement in the
Mechanic's Lien Records of the county in which said land is located; or
(c) If the agreement for the construction of the improvements or any part
thereof or the agreement to perform labor or furnish material or provide spe-
cially fabricated material in connection with such construction resulting in the
lien herein provided for is oral, the recording of an affidavit in the Mechanic's
Lien Records of the county in which said land is located stating that the lien
claimant has entered into an agreement with the owner of such property or
with the owner's contractor or subcontractor for construction of improvements
thereon ....
27. Id. The statute clearly sanctions relation-back to any contract, whether it is general
or special, whether for construction of a building or merely for the delivery of materials, and
whether written or oral. The new amendment does pose some problems, however. The
requirement under § 2(b) that the written contract itself be recorded may be extremely bur-
densome, both financially and logistically. Furthermore, preparation of an affidavit contain-
ing the required information is a formidable task for busy, unsophisticated contractors and
subcontractors. Thus, the vast majority of workmen and materialmen may have lost the
benefits of the Oriental Hotel doctrine. Youngblood, supra note 11, at 693-94.
28. 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971).
29. Id. at 343 (emphasis by court). The majority stated this proposition without citing
any authority on point. In response, the dissent argued that the majority ignored the doc-
trine of after-acquired title. The dissent charged that the majority, after recognizing the
authority of Texas cases holding that a lien may be subsequently perfected, even though at
the time the contract for the construction is made the purchaser is not the owner of the land,
ignored that authority. Id. at 346. For a discussion of the doctrine of after-acquired title,
see Enlow v. Brown, 357 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, no writ); Breckinridge
City Club v. Hardin, 253 S.W. 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1923, no writ); Schultze v.
Alamo Ice & Brewing Co., 21 S.W. 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ).
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affect the priority of a mechanic's lien.30
Since the date of the contract between the owner and the builder usually
antedates the delivery of supplies or the beginning of construction,3' the
effect of the decision would have been to practically eliminate notice of the
mechanic's lien. Thus, a lender could loan money to the owner, relying on
the supposed lack of encumbrances on the land, while in reality the land
was subject to a secret mechanic's lien. The confidence of lenders would
have been seriously undermined.32
In the second opinion on Irving Lumber33 the court gave the subrogated
rights held by a third party, the purchase-money lender, a greater effect
than the original vendor's lien had. By virtue of the third party's subroga-
tion to the vendor's lien, the deed of trust lien, which covered not only the
purchase amount, but also improvements, gained priority over the
mechanic's lien and imposed on the holder of a mechanic's lien an encum-
brance in excess of the original burden. The decision created an unneces-
sary and inequitable burden on mechanics and materialmen.34 Moreover,
the court refused to assign different priorities between the vendor's lien,
which was arguably attributable to Merit Homes's use of some of the funds
to purchase the lots, and the deed of trust, which was attributable to the
entire amount of the loan, when both the vendor's lien and the deed of
trust came into being by the same instrument and transaction. 35
In Justice Mortgage Investors v. C.B. Thompson Construction Co. the
Amarillo court of civil appeals construed the newly enacted section.36 The
property owner entered into an unrecorded oral agreement with Thomp-
son Construction Company for construction of a hotel in 1971. The owner
applied to Justice Mortgage Investors, a lending institution, for construc-
tion financing. As security, Justice took a deed of trust covering the realty,
together with a financing statement covering all personal property then or
thereafter on or attached to the land and any improvements thereon. Both
the deed of trust and the financing statement were filed and recorded with
the county clerk on February 26, 1973. In late February 1973, Thompson
moved a tool shed onto the property and began preliminary staking.37
Subsequently, payments on the construction loan were not delivered, and
Justice foreclosed. Thompson brought an action to recover the unpaid bal-
ance of labor and materials furnished for construction of the hotel. The
30. 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 212, 214 (Feb. 6, 1971).
31. Comment, supra note 25, at 178.
32. Id. at 176.
33. On rehearing following the enactment of § 2, the supreme court retracted its first
Irving opinion but did not base its new decision on a construction of new § 2. See Irving
Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mortgage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971).
34. See Comment, supra note 25, at 180.
35. 468 S.W.2d at 342.
36. 533 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ refd n.r.e.). Although §§ 2(b)
& 2(c) also constitute part of the 1971 amendment to article 5459, § 2(a) is the only portion
subject to diverse judicial interpretation.
37. The first construction labor for which the owner was billed was not performed until
Apr. 13, 1973. This construction was characterized as a "feeble start" and, because of delay
in steel delivery, Thompson was not going "full blast" until July or August.
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court observed that a deed of trust securing a nonpurchase money mort-
gage takes priority over a competing mechanic's lien only if the deed of
trust was recorded prior to the inception of the mechanic's lien.38 Guided
by section 2 of article 5459, the court concluded that Justice's deed of trust
lien was prior in time and, therefore, superior to Thompson's mechanic's
lien, because the tool shed and preliminary staking of the property did not
constitute commencement of construction. 39
II. DIVERSIFIED MORTGAGE INVESTORS V. LLOYD D. BLAYLOCK
GENERAL CONTRACTOR, INC.
In the case of Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D. Blaylock General
Contractor, Inc. the Texas Supreme Court attempted to solve the problem
of priorities among liens by establishing a standard for interpreting the
meaning of "commencement of construction" or "delivery of material"
within section 2(a) of article 5459.40 The controversy involved Blaylock, a
general contractor, who had mechanics' liens on two properties pursuant
to a construction contract with Dollar Inns. Diversified Mortgage Inves-
tors held deed of trust liens securing permanent financing to Dollar Inns
for the purchase of land and the construction of two motels--one in Fort
Worth and one in Irving.
38. Id. at 944. See also Irving Lumber Co. v. Altex Mortgage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341
(Tex. 1971); National W. Life Ins. Co. v. Acreman, 415 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App,-Beau-
mont 1967), a9'd in part and modified inpart, 425 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. 1968); C.B. Shamburger
Lumber Co. v. Holbert, 34 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1931, no writ).
39. 533 S.W.2d at 944. The holding is consistent with the rule in most states that mere
preparation for construction, such as staking, clearing, measuring, filling or making test
oles, is insufficient to define the inception of the mechanic's lien. See, e.g., New Hampshire
Sav. Bank v. Vanner, 216 F. 721 (8th Cir. 1914) (construing the Kansas rule that a building
is commenced when work or labor is begun on the excavation for the foundation), af'd, 240
U.S. 617 (1916); Rupp v. Earl H. Cline & Sons, 230 Md. 573, 188 A.2d 146 (1963); Kloster-
Madsen, Inc. v. Taft's Inc., 303 Minn. 59, 226 N.W.2d 603 (1975); M.E. Kraft Excavating &
Grading Co. v. Barac Constr. Co., 279 Minn. 278, 156 N.W.2d 748 (1968); National Lumber
Co. v. Farmer & Son, 251 Minn. 100, 87 N.W.2d 32 (1957); North Shaker Boulevard Co. v.
Harriman Nat'l Bank, 22 Ohio App. 487, 153 N.E. 909 (1924); Mortgage Assocs. v. Monoma
Shores, Inc., 47 Wis. 2d 171, 177 N.W.2d 340 (1970). See also Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 822
(1965).
Two subsequent decisions, Perkins Constr. Co. v. Ten-Fifteen Corp., 545 S.W.2d 494
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ), and Ferris v. Security Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 545
S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ), stated that a contractor cannot cause
his lien inception date to relate back to the date of inception of the liens of an unrelated
contractor or an earlier separate contract. In Ferris the court held that the owner's contract
with a supplier to furnish air conditioners did not relate back to the time of the original
construction contract because the supplier was not a subcontractor under the original con-
tract, nor was the obligation incurred under the original contract. Perkins dealt with a simi-
lar situation. Even though the original contract price was paid in full, the contractor
generally might still perfect a lien for extra work. The Perkins court held, nevertheless, that
the inception date of the lien for extra work done after the completion of and payment for
the original work does not relate back to the date of the original contract.
40. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
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A. Fort Worth Property4 1
Dollar Inns contracted to purchase the Fort Worth property on Decem-
ber 11, 1972. In early January 1973, after entering into a preliminary con-
struction agreement, Blaylock conducted on-site subsurface soil
investigations. On January 25, 1973, engineering stakes were delivered to
the site and topographical survey work was commenced. Palomar Mort-
gage Investors4 2 and Dollar Inns executed an interim loan agreement on
February 16, 1973, followed by the execution of the final construction
agreement between Blaylock and Dollar Inns on February 21, 1973.
Thereafter, from March 1 to March 5, 1973, subcontractors delivered lum-
ber and fill dirt and placed engineering stakes, while Blaylock's employees
erected batter boards and began excavation. Dollar Inns completed the
purchase of the Fort Worth property on March 8, 1973, and delivered the
deed of trust to Palomar, receiving $598,325.45, of which $135,000 consti-
tuted the purchase price, from Palomar in return. The following day,
Palomar recorded the Fort Worth deed of trust.4 3
B. Irving Property"
On December 29, 1972, Blaylock and Dollar Inns entered into a prelimi-
nary construction agreement. Dollar Inns then contracted to purchase the
Irving property, which was followed by the delivery of engineering stakes
to the site. On February 16, 1973, Palomar and Dollar Inns executed a
loan agreement. During March 1973, Blaylock delivered lumber to the
site, placed the previously delivered engineering stakes, and erected a large
sign denoting motel construction. Thereafter, Blaylock delivered fill dirt
to the Irving site on April 5, 1973, and began excavation and clearing. On
the same day, Dollar Inns completed the purchase of the Irving property
and delivered the deed of trust to Palomar in exchange for a promissory
note in the amount of $1,665,000. An amount of $309,900 was allocated
towards the purchase of the land, $109,900 of which was credited towards
the purchase and release of the prior vendor's lien on the Irving property.
The remainder of the $1,665,000 was allocated for the financing of the
construction on the property.
Following the assignments of the deeds of trust from Palomar to DMI,45
41. Although the facts are similar as to each location, the court determined the lien
priorities independently for each piece of property. Therefore, the facts relative to
construction and financing on the two pieces of property will be discussed separately.
42. Palomar Mortgage Investors, through a three-party agreement, agreed to provide
interim financing for the purchase and construction, while DMI was to provide permanent
financing after construction was completed.
43. Palomar's recordation took place subsequent to the completion of the batter board
construction and the erection of a large sign denoting motel construction.
44. Prior to the acquisition of any interest by the other parties in this case, First Bank
and Trust of Richardson held a vendor's lien on the Irving property under a July 26, 1972,
deed of trust.
45. On Feb. 5, 1974, after construction was completed on the Fort Worth motel, Palo-
mar assigned its security interest in the motel and property (as well as the Irving motel and




Dollar Inns defaulted on both deeds of trust. DMI then foreclosed the
deed of trust liens and conducted foreclosure sales on each. At these sales,
DMI itself purchased the Fort Worth and Irving properties for $600,000
and $1,200,000 respectively.
C. Priority of Liens
The trial court's decision denied Blaylock recovery from DMI due to the
superiority of the deed of trust liens over Blaylock's mechanics' liens.
Since Blaylock recorded neither the construction contract nor a supporting
affidavit, the question of what constitutes "commencement of construc-
tion" or "delivery of material" under section 2(a) of article 5459 con-
fronted the appellate court. 6 Observing that such a determination must
be based on the facts of each particular case, the court's primary inquiry
was whether the commencement of construction or delivery of materials,
which the court determined to include "stakes, iron rods, concrete pipe and
lumber for batter boards' 47 in accordance with the statutory language,48
was sufficiently visible to constitute notice 9.4  Relying upon these determi-
nations, the court of appeals found that since the contractor had delivered
stakes, surveyed the property, placed stakes on the site, delivered lumber,
and started excavation work on both properties prior to the recording of
the deed of trust, the mechanics' liens had their inception prior to the deed
of trust liens." Nevertheless, the court held that the deed of trust liens
were superior to the extent that they secured the purchase amount and not
the construction loans.5 ' Furthermore, although all mechanics' liens were
cut off by the foreclosure under the deeds of trust, the court held that the
mechanics' lienholders were entitled to have their liens satisfied out of any
consideration received at foreclosure that exceeded the purchase money
46. Blaylock v. Dollar Inns of America, Inc., 548 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1977). The trial court found Dollar Inns liable on the construction contract, but ruled that
Blaylock take nothing from DMI because deed of trust liens were superior to mechanics'
liens. 576 S.W.2d at 796.
47. 548 S.W.2d at 931.
48. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5452, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979), which
provides:
The words "material," "furnish material," or "material furnished" as used in
this Act are to be construed to mean any part or all of the following:
(1) Material, machinery, fixtures or tools incorporated in the work, or con-
sumed in the direct prosecution of the work, or ordered and delivered for such
incorporation or such consumption.
49. 548 S.W.2d at 931. See also Justice Mortgage Investors v. C.B. Thompson Constr.
Co., 533 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
50. 548 S.W.2d at 931. But see Perkins Constr. Co. v. Ten-Fifteen Corp., 545 S.W.2d
494 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ) (clearing job site not sufficient to constitute
commencement of construction); Justice Mortgage Investors v. C.B. Thompson Constr. Co.,
533 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ refed n.r.e.) (placing tool shed on
property and preliminary staking not sufficient).
51. Where money is advanced with an understanding that the advancement shall be
secured by a first lien upon the property, the tender will generally be subrogated to the prior
liens discharged by the money so advanced. See Perkins Constr. Co. v. Ten-Fifteen Corp.,
545 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ); Ferris v. Security Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 545 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ); Whiteselle v. Texas Loan
Agency, 27 S.W. 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ refd).
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loaned by the grantee of the deed of trust. 2 This holding implied that the
lender could cut off all rights of lien claimants merely by bidding at fore-
closure no more than the amount of the purchase money advanced.
5 3
On appeal, the supreme court rejected the lower court's case-by-case ap-
proach to interpretation of section 2(a) of article 5459 as well as the court's
sole reliance on a "visibility" standard. 4 The supreme court attempted to
articulate a more definitive standard by which to ascertain inception under
the section 2(a) guideline of actual construction or delivery of materials.
Actual commencement of construction required the "placing of something
of permanent value on the land, as opposed to preliminary or preparatory
activities or structures."55 Accordingly, under the "commencement of con-
struction" provision of article 5459, the court held that the inception of the
mechanic's lien occurs only when the activity "(1) is conducted on the land
itself; (2) is visible upon the land; and (3) constitutes either (a) an activity
which is defined as an improvement under the Texas statute or (b) the
excavation for or the laying of the foundation of a building or a struc-
ture."56 In order for the "delivery of material" to signal the inception of a
lien, the court must find "(1) that there has been a delivery of material to
the site of construction; (2) that such material is visible upon inspection of
the land; and (3) that such material constitutes either (a) material which
will be consumed during construction or (b) material which will be incor-
porated in the permanent structure. 57
52. 548 S.W.2d at 934. The supreme court in Irving Lumber expressly stated that it was
not deciding whether the holder of the mechanic's lien is entitled to pursue a portion of the
proceeds of the sale in the hands of the party holding the deed of trust lien. Irving Lumber
Co. v. AIltex Mortgage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341, 344 (Tex. 1971).
53. If the lender acquires the property at foreclosure for the amount of the purchase
money advanced, the inference arises that the lender is receiving property worth that
amount and therefore is not receiving any excess proceeds over the amount of the purchase
money. See Heath & Bentley, Real Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 27
(1978).
54. The court of appeals had stated:
[W]e feel that the chief inquiry to be made by the courts is whether there was
visibility of commencement of construction such that a person, upon inspec-
tion of the land, would be put on notice that construction work had com-
menced or, because of material delivered and resting on the land, work was to
commence shortly thereafter.
548 S.W.2d at 931.
55. 576 S.W.2d at 802. Thus, in most circumstances, commencement of construction of
improvements in the form of a building or a structure must entail excavation or the laying of
foundation. Id.
56. Id. The supreme court determined that where the activity defined as an "improve-
ment" has commenced or is being performed, such activity is sufficient to constitute com-
mencement of construction of an improvement under art. 5459. Id. For statutory purposes,
improvements include:
[A]butting sidewalks and streets and utilities therein; clearing, grubbing,
draining or fencing of land; wells, cisterns, tanks, reservoirs, or artificial lakes
or pools made for supplying or storing water; all pumps, siphons, and wind-
mills or other machinery or apparatus used for raising water for stock, domes-
tic use or for irrigation purposes; and the planting of orchard trees, grubbing
out of orchards and replacing trees, and pruning said orchard trees.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5452, § I (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
57. 576 S.W.2d at 803.
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The court then applied these guidelines to the facts surrounding each
location. As to the Fort Worth property, the court determined that the
construction activities performed by Blaylock prior to the recording of the
deed of trust58 constituted work merely preliminary to or preparatory for
construction and did not satisfy the criteria for actual commencement of
construction. 59 Further, the material delivered to the site60 was not of the
character giving rise to the inception of a lien because none of the material
ultimately formed part of the permanent structure or was consumed in
such construction. The court found that actual construction began March
16, 1973, when Blaylock commenced the foundation work on the property.
Thus, inception of the Fort Worth mechanic's lien occurred after March 9,
the date the deed of trust was recorded. 6'
On the other hand, the court held that the work on the Irving project,
performed before recordation of the deed of trust on April 13, 1973, was
sufficient to constitute the inception of a mechanic's lien. These activities
included excavating and clearing of land,62 the delivery of concrete section
63 6pipe, and excavation and laying of a foundation.64
Having determined that the inception of the mechanic's lien on the Ir-
ving site was prior to the recordation of the deed of trust lien, the supreme
court considered the priorities of such liens. The court relied on the gen-
eral rule that if the inception date of a mechanic's lien occurs subsequent
to the recordation of a deed of trust, as in the case of the Fort Worth
property, the deed of trust is senior to the mechanic's lien. Thus, foreclo-
sure of the senior deed of trust lien will extinguish the junior mechanic's
lien. Alternatively, the'court stated that if the inception date of a mechan-
ic's lien is prior to the recording of a deed of trust, a determination is
necessary as to whether the party contracting with the mechanic or materi-
alman had any legal or equitable interest in the property at the inception
of the lien. If no such interest exists, then the lien could not arise. If such
58. The construction activities performed prior to March 9 consisted of the following:
subsurface investigation, topographical survey work, the spreading of fill dirt, staking, exca-
vation for a retaining wall, and erection of a sign.
59. 576 S.W.2d at 803.
60. The material included bundles of stakes, lumber for batter boards, and fill dirt.
61. 576 S.W.2d at 803. This approach is apparently in line with the majority of jurisdic-
tions that have dealt with statutes with similar wording and determined that preliminary or
preparatory activities are not sufficient to constitute commencement of construction. See
New Hampshire Sav. Bank v. Varner, 216 F. 721 (8th Cir. 1914), affd, 240 U.S. 617 (1916);
Kiene v. Hodge, 90 Iowa 212, 57 N.W. 717 (1894); Rupp v. Earl H. Cline & Sons, 230 Md.
573, 188 A.2d 146 (1963); National Lumber Co. v. Farmer & Son, 251 Minn. 100, 87 N.W.2d
82 (1957); North Shaker Boulevard Co. v. Harriman Nat'l Bank, 22 Ohio App. 487, 153 N.E.
909 (1924); Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 822 (1965).
62. The activity, including general site clearance and the digging up and removal of
several large trees and a swimming pool, is encompassed under the expanded definition of
"improvement," which includes "clearing, grubbing, draining or fencing of land." See note
56 supra.
63. The concrete pipe delivered to the site was visible upon inspection of the site, and
constituted a material that would form part of the permanent structure; thus, its delivery was
sufficient to constitute inception of the lien. 576 S.W.2d at 803.
64. The excavation and laying of a foundation clearly constitutes commencement of the
construction of an "improvement." See note 56 supra.
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an interest does exist, then the doctrine of after-acquired title is applied.65
This doctrine provides:
[T]he lien attaches to whatever legal or equitable interest the con-
tracting party had when the work was begun, and thereafter attaches
to any other or greater interest whenever acquired before the lien is
enforced: provided that the after-acquired title enlarges an estate or
interest to which the lien has already become attached.6 6
Accordingly, when the deed of trust lien is foreclosed, the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale takes the property encumbered by the mechanic's lien.67
In the case of the Irving property, this doctrine worked to expand the
mechanic's lien to include the legal title to the property acquired by Dollar
Inns upon consummation of the preexisting sale contract. Thus, the date
of inception of the mechanic's lien preceded both the execution and the
recordation of DMI's deed of trust lien on the Irving property and, absent
other factors, 68 the mechanic's lien would be senior and superior.
69
An additional issue in this case involved the doctrine of equitable subro-
gation.7" This doctrine was triggered by the existence of a prior vendor's
lien, preceding any interest of any of the parties here involved, that was
purchased by Dollar Inns with funds provided by Palomar and later as-
signed to DMI.7' The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals'
holding that DMI was equitably subrogated to the rights under the prior
vendor's lien.72 By virtue of its subrogation to the first lien, DMI occupied
the same position as the prior vendor's lien holder held with respect to that
lien.73
The result of the court's holding was that the liens stood in the following
order of priority: (1) the prior vendor's lien (in the amount of $109,000) to
which DMI was equitably subrogated; (2) Blaylock's mechanic's lien in the
65. 576 S.W.2d at 805.
66. Id. at 805-06. For further discussion of the doctrine of after-acquired title, see Jones
v. Mawson-Peterson Lumber Co., 150 P.2d 795, 797 (Colo. 1944); Service Lumber & Supply
Co. v. Cox, 123 So. 820, 821 (Fla. 1929); Paget v. Peters, 286 P. 983, 988 (Or. 1930). See also
Annot., 52 A.L.R. 693 (1928).
67. 576 S.W.2d at 806.
68. The doctrine of equitable subrogation is one such "other factor." See id.
69. Id.
70. Subrogation arises by operation of law or by implication in equity where a person
has been compelled to pay off a prior encumbrance in order to protect himself, or where he
has paid the debt of another in such circumstances that equity will afford him the security or
obligation held by the creditor whose claim has been paid. See Texas Co. v. Miller, 165
F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1947); First State Bank v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 262
S.W. 225, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1924, no writ).
7 1. See note 42 supra.
72. In according the doctrine of equitable subrogation favorable treatment, the court
noted the well-established history of such a view. See Faires v. Cockrill, 88 Tex. 428, 437, 31
S.W. 190, 194 (1895), in which the Texas Supreme Court stated, "[plerhaps the courts of no
state have gone further in applying the doctrine of subrogation than has the court of this
state." The court also recognized the importance of the doctrine to lenders in Texas due to
the protection offered a lienholder from intervening liens, at least with respect to the amount
of the initial lien, when the lienholder discharges a prior superior lien. 576 S.W.2d at 807.
73. The court rejected the argument that the doctrine of after-acquired title established
the priority of Blaylock's lien by noting that the prior vendor's lien existed prior to Dollar
Inns' equitable or legal interest in the land. 576 S.W.2d at 807.
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amount of $136,767; and (3) the balance due on the deed of trust note held
by DMI.74 The court agreed with the court of appeals' holding that
Blaylock could pursue the excess proceeds75 of the foreclosure sale.76
Since DMI bid on the land at its own foreclosure sale, no cash actually
changed hands. Instead DMI took title to the land and the supreme court,
as well as the court of appeals, determined that Blaylock's proper remedy
was in the form of a $136,767 money judgment against DMI for the un-
paid portion of its lien on the Irving property.77
The Texas Supreme Court's interpretation of section 2(a) of article 5459
regarding the inception of a mechanic's lien and the court's articulation of
a priority test for mechanics' liens relative to other liens are the most im-
portant aspects of the decision. The court attempted to clarify and define
the law surrounding the inception of mechanics' liens and the priorities of
such liens. Nevertheless, the holding left several issues unanswered and
created as many new problems as it resolved.
In construing section 2(a) of article 5459, the court established a perma-
nency criterion for the inception of a mechanic's lien via actual commence-
ment of activities or delivery of materials.78 This test provides lenders,
mechanics and materialmen, and courts alike with a concise definition of
the activities necessary to constitute inception. In addition, the test pro-
vides a prospective lender quantifiable standards on which to base his de-
cision regarding the acceptance of a deed of trust as security.79
One fundamental flaw in the court's standard is that it frustrates the
purpose of section 2(a), which was enacted to relieve the lender of the
problem of secret or silent mechanics' liens by requiring either actual or
constructive notice of an existing encumbrance on the land. ° By holding
that preliminary and preparatory activities such as staking, posting of
signs, and the delivery of certain materials do not satisfy section 2(a) re-
quirements for the inception of a mechanic's lien, the court precludes ac-
tivities that provide a lender effective notice.8 Such obvious disregard for
the purpose of section 2(a) is likely to result in legislative action to
reformulate the standards, presumably more in tune with the original goals
of section 2(a).82 A second weakness of the test for inception is the need
74. Id.
75. The court defined excess proceeds as all proceeds received at the foreclosure sale of
Dec. 3, 1974, in excess of $109,000 (the extent of DMI's subrogation). Id. at 808.
76. See note 52 supra. This holding meant that Blaylock's security interest transferred
to the excess proceeds from the sale (which stand in place of the property). See also Jeffrey
v. Bond, 509 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex. 1974); Pearson v. Teddlie, 235 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1950, no writ).
77. 576 S.W.2d at 808.
78. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
79. 576 S.W.2d at 802.
80. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
81. Although a lender may have actual notice, he is not charged with notice of the
mechanic's lien because these preliminary activities do not incept the mechanic's lien.
82. One possible legislative action is the elimination of § 2(a) entirely, thereby allowing
perfection of a mechanic's lien by the holder of such lien only by either recording an affida-
vit of his agreement under § 2(c) or recording the contract itself under § 2(b). Although this
would not solve the problem of contractors being saddled with the burden (both financial
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for a continual reliance on future litigation. Although the supreme court
expressly overruled the court of appeals' case-by-case analysis as to what
constitutes inception of a mechanic's lien,83 in reality, the supreme court
merely changed the focus of future court battles. Instead of a case-by-case
analysis regarding inception of a mechanic's lien, future litigation will in-
volve a case-by-case determination of whether activities conducted were of
a permanent nature.
Despite the problems involved in the newly established inception stan-
dards, the supreme court's resolution of the priority problems among the
various liens was perhaps the most equitable solution possible.84 Logi-
cally, a lienholder is encumbered only by other liens of which he has ac-
tual or constructive notice. The result reached by the court is consistent
with this reasoning. The court properly gave the vendor's lien on the Ir-
ving property first priority because this lien existed prior to any involve-
ment of Blaylock, Dollar Inns, or DMI.8" Blaylock's mechanic's lien was
appropriately next in the ordering of priorities because, at the time of its
inception on the Irving property, the only encumbrance of notice to
Blaylock was the prior vendor's lien. Finally, DMI's deed of trust was
assigned the lowest priority since at the time of the loan to Dollar Inns,
and logistical) of filing their contracts (assuming knowledge of such requirements), it would
serve to curtail the endless stream of litigation certain to continue as the provisions now
stand. For state legislation similar to that suggested, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3115 (West
1974).
83. 576 S.W.2d at 801.
84. The court reached this solution upon rehearing whereby an earlier opinion was
withdrawn on the issue and substituted by the present one. Originally the court issued a
holding that forced one who held a vendor's lien and a deed of trust simultaneously to make
an election of which to foreclose. In the court's opinion, these remedies were mutually ex-
clusive. Since DMI foreclosed its deed of trust lien, its subrogated rights under the vendor's
lien were no longer available. This result left Irving Lumber as the applicable case when the
vendor's lien was foreclosed, while DM1 was controlling in a deed of trust foreclosure. The
court in DM1 (originally) also followed its earlier Irving Lumber decision in refusing to
address whether the holder of a mechanic's lien could then pursue a portion of the profits of
the sale from the holder of the deed of trust lien who foreclosed. See Diversified Mortgage
Investors v. Lloyd D. Blaylock Gen. Contractor, Inc., 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 521, 530 (July 30,
1978). Fortunately, the court reheard the case on this issue, and retracted its election of
remedies ruling. In addition the court held that a mechanic's lienholder could pursue profits
in excess of the purchase price. 576 S.W.2d at 808. This holding upon rehearing was the
only possible solution, since if the inception of the mechanic's lien is prior in time, the holder
of the vendor's lien and deed of trust is charged with notice thereof, and should not be
allowed a windfall by an opportune election of remedies. Such would have been the case
had the court determined that the holder of a mechanic's lien could not pursue the holder of
a vendor's lien or deed of trust for amounts received in excess of the purchase price. Under
such a holding, if the deed of trust was deemed prior to the inception of the mechanic's lien,
the holder of the deed of trust could have foreclosed, thereby extinguishing the mechanic's
lien. Conversely, if the mechanic's lien was prior, or if there was any doubt as to priority,
the vendor's lien could be foreclosed. In either case, the holder of the mechanic's lien would
have been without remedy.
85. Note that even if the mechanic's lien due to the after-acquired title doctrine is in-
cepted prior to the purchase of the property, the vendor's lien still achieves priority to the
extent of the purchase price because the purchaser only receives title encumbered by the
vendor's lien. The mechanic's lienholder accepts the burdens on, as well as the benefits of, a
subsequently acquired legal title. Although the DMI court did not face this situation, the
opinion implies such a result. See 576 S.W.2d at 807.
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there was notice of both the prior vendor's lien and Blaylock's mechanic's
lien. Any other ordering of priorities would be inequitable because a lien
would be subject to an encumbrance of which the holder had no possible
knowledge.
There remains one other area of conflict between section 2 of article
5459 and the case law in light of the decisions of Irving Lumber and DM1.
A purchaser of land and a builder may contract for improvements before
the purchaser acquires title. If the builder immediately records the con-
tract, he has complied with the statutory requirement for establishing the
inception of his mechanic's lien. 6 Yet the date of inception of a lien
against a prospective holder of a vendor's lien does not establish the prior-
ity of that mechanic's lien. 7 Thus, the holdings of the court and the lan-
guage of the statute conflict. 88
III. CONCLUSION
In providing liens for workmen and materialmen, legitimate interests of
other individuals, such as owners, lender-mortgagees, and third-party pur-
chasers, must be considered. The need for certainty in business relation-
ships requires that priority between competing liens be resolved in a
predictable manner. In formulating priority rules in DMI, the Texas
Supreme Court solves many of the questions unanswered by previous deci-
cions, and thus inserts somewhat more precise guidelines on which to rely.
The downfall of the DMI decision, however, is the court's interpretation of
the standard that must be met in order to constitute inception of a mechan-
ic's lien. Not only does the court's solution ignore the purpose behind sec-
tion 2 of article 5459, but it also fails to reduce the necessity for future
litigation. Although this area of the law is extremely complex, a set of
standards is necessary that will provide fairness and certainty to all con-
cerned, thereby eliminating confrontations requiring litigation. The diffi-
culty with formulating a set of satisfactory standards is evident from the
fact that in each of the two predominant cases involving mechanics' liens
since 1971 the court has withdrawn its original opinion and substituted a
more appropriate one. In spite of the difficulty, it is to be hoped that judi-
cial or legislative inception standards will be forthcoming that are equita-
ble and quantifiable, as well as in accord with the original legislative
purposes.
Richard W Fine
86. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § 2(b), (c) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
For text of those provisions, see note 25 supra.
87. See Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mortgage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341, 344 (Tex. 1971).
88. See Comment, supra note 25, at 180. It is likely that the conffict will be resolved in
favor of the vendor's lienholder because the party contracting with the mechanic's
lienholder before acquisition of the property gets a title encumbered by the vendor's lien.
Thus, the holder of the mechanic's lien claims title only as good as the contracting party has.
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